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Abstract 
Reporting on a study undertaken in cooperation with International Federation Red Cross Red Crescent (IFRC) the 
paper contributes to the understanding of using standard global tools in humanitarian logistics. We present three 
case studies of disaster response in Haiti, Turkey and the Ivory Coast with particular attention to (1) Future 
requirements to humanitarian supply chains; and (2) IFRC Global Logistics Services’ use of standard tools in 
different local contexts. A cross case analysis concludes with initial implications for practice and further research. 
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1. Introduction and purpose 
Humanitarian logistics is about preparedness (preparing for disaster including developing competence, pre-
positioning of stocks etc.), response (during a disaster), and recovery (getting back to normal state). Typical 
assistance required in the aftermath of a disaster to stabilize a community after search and rescue is temporary 
shelter, health support, water and sanitation, food and cooking equipment. In total close 22 billion USD was spent in 
2013 on international humanitarian response [1]. Logistics account for up to 60-80% of total cost and there is much 
room for improvements [2]. Lack of funding, particularly for preparedness, makes it difficult for responding 
agencies to plan and run good operations. A commonly quoted statistic says that 1 dollar spent in preparedness 
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activities is worth 7 dollars in response. Increasing prices of food and fuel, lack of information about needs, lack of 
coordination, local and international capacity, and competence are some of the causes resulting in high costs and 
fewer people being helped [3].  
Following the response to the Asian Pacific Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, research within 
humanitarian logistics has attracted great interest. Much however, is accused of lacking relevance [4]. In line with 
logistics in general [5] and other management research [6], it is pointed at the gap between research and practice. 
Some research laboratories and projects answer the call for more useful research by working closely with the 
humanitarian sector and directly responding to commissioned projects calls. Disseminating this research in scientific 
journals is challenging, both because of time constraints and because the scientific community is sceptic, questioning 
its rigor [7]. Action research (AR), i.e. experiments on real problems designed to assist in solutions is one possible 
approach. Here the researcher involves highly in an iterative process of problem identification, planning, action, and 
evaluation intending to contribute to academic theory as well as practical action [8]. AR is a ‘scientific approach to 
study the resolution of important social or organizational issues together with those who experience these issues 
directly’ [9]. 
Through research undertaken during the past 7-10 years, the authors have focused on field studies and 
development of tools with a high attention to relevance. Among other challenges, we have worked with (a) The 
importance of understanding of humanitarian needs, i.e. demand, in disaster preparedness and response to improve 
planning and preparedness and thus efficiency and effectiveness and; (b) How the local community in disaster areas 
are able to cope, how they can improve, and for what they need assistance, particularly regarding the organizations’ 
use of standard global tools and how they fit with the local context.  
In response to (a) A preliminary concept and prototype of a demand-forecasting tool was developed [10]. The 
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) tested the prototype when they 
developed their five-year logistics strategy using the data as a basis to calculate activities with according 
preparedness and response requirements in each region [11]. IFRC is currently implementing this strategy. In 
response to (b), the authors undertook case studies, requested by IFRC, of three different disaster responses to 
analyze present local capacity and alternatives for the future to test conclusions from a general business case 
developed by IFRC and which also used results from (a) [12]. This paper reports on the latter project. 
1.1. Purpose of this paper 
With the purpose of understanding how disaster prone countries can prepare for disasters by building their own 
logistics competence and capacity, and for what they need international assistance, this paper focus (1) Main 
requirements important for design of future disaster response and preparedness supply chains; and (2) Use of 
standard tools offered by IFRC as a logistics service provider and how these adapt to local contexts. 
In this study we do not focus on Sphere standards, but on organizational standards developed by IFRC, and in 
particular those of logistics relevance. 
1.2. Research design 
 The study reports on three case studies of IFRC responses to the Turkey Earthquake in 2011, the Haiti 
Earthquake in 2010, and the Civil Unrest in Ivory Coast in 2011. IFRC selected the three cases to represent different 
disaster types and sizes, different strengths of National Societies, and different geographical regions. The studies are 
part of a long-term cooperation with IFRC using action research. Also called design science [13], action research is 
used in management information systems (MIS) [14], but less in supply chain management. Following 
recommendations by [15], this study took the following measures to secure rigor and appropriate documentation of 
the research process:   
1) Design: Research questions and the purpose of study were formulated. Key aspects included treating the 
unit of analysis as an active object, and presenting the case context, i.e. its boundaries.  
2) Data Collection: Case study protocols for each study describe how data was collected. Great care was 
taken in developing interview guides to secure comparable results. We used triangulation with multiple methods for 
data collection and analysis. The team-based approach used increases reliability of data, provided different skills and 
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gave unique opportunities for data collection requiring more than one researcher. Furthermore, the data access and 
trust developed between the practitioners and researchers was important. Formal presentations to key actors and/or 
their review of the reports to substantiate the findings occurred during the process. 
3) Data Analysis: The cross-case analysis of the three cases provides opportunities for categorization and 
pattern matching. The cyclical process including joint reflections with the unit of analysis was important. More 
analysis need to be undertaken with additional data to be collected, particularly on the implementation of the 
logistics strategy developed. 
2. Case description and analysis 
GLS’ global structure consists of the Geneva secretariat headquarters, zonal logistics units in Kuala Lumpur, 
Panama, Nairobi, and Beirut, and a GLS office in Dubai [16]. In addition IFRCs 187 National Societies (NS) have 
logistics resources such as warehouses, staff, equipment, etc. [17]. We describe the disasters and according response 
briefly for each case followed by a cross-case analysis presented in tables for the sake of limitations in paper length. 
2.1. Response to Civil Unrest in Ivory Coast 2011 
Côte d’Ivoire has been in turmoil since the contested presidential election in November 2010. A period of 
political tension, instability and violence culminated in the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo on 11th April, 2011. The weeks 
of post-election violence led to thousands of deaths and provoked mass population movements within Cote d’Ivoire 
to neighboring countries, including Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and especially Liberia, where the majority 
of Ivoirian refugees had sought protection and assistance. Initial assessments revealed dire humanitarian needs 
including NFIs, shelter, health services, psychosocial support, livelihoods, potable water and sanitation installations.  
Because of the conflict situation, IFRC worked with NS in the neighboring countries in updating their 
contingency plans, leaving International Committee Red Cross Red Crescent (ICRC) to take care of the IDPs within 
Côte d’Ivoire. By 6th January, 2011, ICRC was working with Croix Rouge Côte d’Ivoire (CRCI) in providing first 
aid and evacuating the wounded to hospitals. At this point, the Movement coordination mechanism in Abidjan was 
already working in close consultation with IFRC [18]. From 3rd April to 5th May, 2011, CRCI worked relentlessly 
to provide emergency relief aid to the victims of the crisis and put up an emergency team which worked in close 
coordination with the FACT (Field Assessment Coordination Team) deployed on 5th May. After conducting 
assessments, a PoA (Plan of Action) was published on 6th June [19], followed by the mobilization table launched by 
Dubai ZLU (Zone Logistics Unit). IFRC launched an emergency appeal on 17th June to assist 60.000 households. In 
spite of only 11% appeal funding coverage, 50% of the assessed needs in terms of shelter and hygiene kits, water 
supply and livelihoods were provided with 12.5% more NFIs compared to the original appeal. New needs 
assessments were recommended, but due to lack of funding most activities had to be put on standby or forwarded to 
other humanitarian actors and ICRC [20]. In summary, there were many parts of the IFRC organization involved in 
a majority of the activities with unclear division of tasks and lack of appropriate human, financial and physical 
resources resulting in an insufficient response from IFRC characterized by huge gaps. A consistent lack of funding, 
in particular for preparedness, suggests that there is lack of resources to make a step-change.  
2.2. Response to earthquake in Van, Turkey 2011 
On October 23, 2011, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake struck Van, Turkey. The earthquake caused a wide destruction 
in the city. The earthquake and its aftershocks were mostly felt in Hakkari, Bitlis, Agri, Igdir, Erzurum, Mus, 
Bingol, Tunceli, Batman, Sirnak, Mardin, Diyarbakir, Siirt and Sanliurfa provinces. 2,337 aftershocks were 
registered. 601 people died, 4,152 people were injured. 2,309 buildings completely collapsed and 11,847 buildings 
were severely damaged. The government mobilized necessary human and technical resources for the immediate 
deployment to the affected area. The affected area was divided into 71 zones for search and rescue operations (SAR) 
and was completed in 67 zones by 1st November [21]. The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency 
(DEMP) under the Prime Ministry, which is the main disaster management authority in the country, sent a team of 
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20 experts to Van to facilitate effective rescue and relief operations. In addition, 200 experts from various provinces 
were dispatched to Van to conduct a rapid assessment of the damage caused by the earthquake. The Van earthquake 
can be considered a mid-sized disaster occurring in a prepared country with a strong and independent national 
society, namely the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS) that works closely with DEMP. Two factors that made 
the operation challenging were the cold weather conditions together with the harsh geographical characteristics of 
the district and the intense aftershocks. 
As soon as the earthquake erupted, the TRCS established the Crisis Management Desk in the Disaster 
Management Center in its headquarters, Ankara, and made all its emergency response units fully operational. In 
addition, 6 other Regional Disaster Management Centers, and 2 other Local Disaster Management Centers of TRCS 
participated in the operations. The IFRC provided assistance to the TRCS from its Europe Zone Office in Budapest, 
backed by the Geneva technical team. TRCS is an example of a Resilient National Society (RNS) defined as “a 
national society, which has the ability when exposed to hazards to withstand, to support themselves and respond to 
the hazard in a timely and effective manner with or without external support.” [22] When an RNS is responding to a 
small-medium sized disaster, involvement of GLS is somewhat limited. Having its own logistics resources on the 
ground, TRCS declined using an IFRC logistics team for dispatch from the airport to Van. TRCS’ vast experience, 
sufficient funding, good supply processes, and own domestic logistics network meant little help was needed from 
GLS. However, due the approach of the winter, TRCS called upon GLS to assist with mobilizing resources 
internationally amounting to 31.7% of the total in-kind donations (IKD). 
2.3. Response to earthquake in Haiti 2010 
On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti. Port-au-Prince (PAP), the capital city, 
experienced widespread destruction. In Léogane and Gressier 70 per cent of homes were destroyed or damaged. 
Overall, three million people were affected. This included 222,570 deaths, 300,572 injuries, and 1.5 million people 
left homeless [23]. The earthquake in Haiti can be considered a mega disaster. Several factors made the 
humanitarian response especially complex. Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the world frequently struck by 
disasters. The infrastructure was significantly affected with damage to the port which was closed for two weeks and 
many blocked roads. The airport in Port-au-Prince (PaP) was initially closed and then overwhelmed by humanitarian 
assistance and cargo. The central government was crippled with the presidential palace and other government 
buildings destroyed and coordination was hampered by power and communication outages. 
More than 1000 humanitarian organizations responded, many newly formed [24]. Fifty-nine NS, many already 
active in the country participated [25] and the response included 21 Emergency Response Units (ERUs) such as 
field hospitals, water treatment plants, logistics bases, portable operations centers, emergency telecom infrastructure, 
and sanitation supplies. The response saw both multi-lateral and bi-lateral engagements between NS and Haiti Red 
Cross (HRC). While the multi-lateral can be seen as challenging in large-scale disasters such as this one, the many 
bi-lateral efforts created lack of coordination with additional costs, duplication, reduced ability to make strategic 
decisions, such as prioritization, and inefficient logistics due to lack of pipeline visibility. GLS, on the other hand, 
was perceived by some as inflexible, sometimes arrogant, and lack of priority in terms of customer service, GLS not 
taking responsibility for supplier failures, and with long response times if items had to be procured. Overall, after 
the first few weeks there was a lack of joint planning between programs, and IFRC and PNS [26].The transitions 
from emergency to recovery occurred late. After one year there were still over 1,000 camps with approximately 
680,000 IDPs. 
2.4. Cross-case analysis 
The project undertaken by IFRC GLS, within which the three case studies were done, concerned alternatives of 
providing international logistics services managed and operated outside the responding NS’ own capacity when 
preparing for and responding to natural and complex disasters.  
Two main overall elements that affect the management and delivery of international logistics services are the 
funding (ability to deliver) and the demand (the needs to be fulfilled). Overall findings concluded that in general 
future supply chain design should account for aspects such as increasing need. However, relative funding 
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availability has decreased due to increasing commodity costs (e.g. oil and food increased by 30% and 35% 
respectively from 2007-2010). The demand for aid is relatively predictable with the same 20 countries received the 
bulk of the funds over the last 10 years. Finally, the study concluded that donors will require improvements in 
logistics; and that changing delivery mechanisms with more use of cash will require different logistics capabilities 
compared to the present [28]. 
2.4.1. The disasters, the operations, and their context 
Table 1 shows some major differences in the context and of the three operations when comparing the cases.  
 Table 1. Comparing the three cases, their context, and the operations on some main dimensions 
Dimension Ivory Cost Van Haiti 
Type of disaster Civil Unrest Earthquake Earthquake 
Region Africa Europe Americas 
Size Medium Medium Mega 
Complexity Large Medium Large 
Host country vulnerability High Low High 
Strength Host National Society Low High Low 
Number of actors involved Relatively many Relatively few Very many 
Needs for international assistance High Low High 
Available funding Very low High High 
Transition to recovery Slow Quick Slow 
Availability of data Low High High 
Amount of GLS services used Medium Low High 
Amount of bilateral donations Low Medium High| 
Local preparedness Very low Very high Low 
2.4.2. Requirements for design of future preparedness and response supply chains 
At present GLS supports NS in five main logistics activities of which GLS handles strategic planning and 
logistics standards, the Host National Society (HNS) manages its own demand and information management, while 
supply management can be carried out by GLS, the NS itself, commercial service providers, or other humanitarian 
organizations [27]. Hence, GLS uses standardized tools and processes in their own activities as well in the provision 
of support to NS in their demand- and information management and whoever is responsible for supply management.  
Table 2 shows main requirements’ importance for design of future preparedness and response supply chains and 
GLS’ capabilities as identified in our studies in 2012, i.e. how the respondents perceived the standardized support 
provided by GLS at the time of the operations in 2010 and 2011 compared to what they think is most important. 
 Table 2. Requirements (A: critical; B: very important; C: important) & GLS capability (0%: fail; 50%: fail if A or B, OK is C; 100%: OK) 
Logistics activities Requirements Ivory Cost Van Haiti 
Type Importance (I) and perceived GLS capability (GLS)  I GLS I GLS I GLS 
STRATEGIC 
PLANNING 
Security A ok NA NA NA NA 
Neutral and credible logistics service provider that meets donors’ criteria  A fail A ok A ok 
To be used as a fundraising and advocacy tool but be cost neutral  A fail B fail C ok 
Local knowledge - ability to assess the logistics infrastructure A ok NA NA NA NA 
Management of a significant volume of logistics response services  B fail C ok B ok 
LOGISTICS 
STANDARDS 
Provide adequate/state-of-the-art expertise, tools and delivery information A fail A fail A fail 
Ensure up to date supply chain delivery mechanisms to handle cash/in-kind  A fail B fail B ok 
Develop NS logistics capacity in line with the national role A fail C fail C ok 
Ability to use funds to develop supply chain in NS A fail C ok C ok 
Work with internal NS resources A fail C ok C ok 
Collaborate with the Logistics Cluster and other humanitarian supply chains B fail C ok C ok 
DEMAND 
MANAGEMENT 
Security A ok NA NA NA NA 
Clear focal point, list of logistics services, consolidate demand A fail A fail A fail 
Ability to estimate demand and put in place pre-agreements when possible  A fail B fail B ok 
Ability to inform and manage user/customer expectations/reasonable lead 
times to allow for order fulfillment A fail B ok B fail 
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Provide a viable alternative from the WFP UNHRD service C fail C ok C ok 
Fast quotation for services, accurate invoices, and prompt resolution of 
errors  C fail A fail A fail 
SUPPLY 
MANAGEMENT 
Security A ok NA NA NA NA 
Specify immediate availability when required for all development and 
disaster types A fail A fail A ok 
Delivery to agreed timings, pro-active information order status and 
problems  A fail A fail A fail 
Help NS coordinate and manage engagement with other logistics providers  A fail C ok C ok 
Up front agreements for fast engagement when required  A fail C ok C ok 
Allow framework agreements and flexible payment methods (consignment 
stock, etc.) A fail C ok C ok 
Understand/develop local market A fail NA NA NA NA 
Open communication on service / product development and performance  B fail C ok C ok 
Ability for flexible pricing based on lead times  B fail C ok C fail 
To act as a supplier of transport and warehouse services  C fail B fail B ok 
Capability to provide supply chain services to external organizations  C fail C ok C NA 
Contractual arrangements based on joint rewards rather than penalties  C fail C ok C fail 
INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT 
Timely, clear and well specified requirements and reports on use of 
contributions A fail A fail A fail 
Have a designated person (reporting delegate) (either from NS or IFRC) A fail NA NA NA  
Evidence based cost efficient and effective movement wide supply chain  A fail C fail C ok 
Active support for writing appeals/support pro-active funding strategies A fail C fail C ok 
Proper coordination and management of information flow among 
Movement partners A fail NA NA NA NA 
Proper infrastructure (both hardware and software) A fail NA NA NA NA 
Prove competitive logistics service cost to the NS or Zone NA NA B fail B ok 
3. Discussion 
Table 2 shows that in particular requirements’ importance vary between Ivory Coast on the one hand and Van 
and Haiti on the other. The respondents in the Ivory Coast case thought the majority of requirements were more 
important and they also pointed out additional ones (compared to the initial interview questions) including security, 
local knowledge, and support for additional activities such as reporting, fund-raising, and coordination. Possible 
reasons for this difference include disaster type (security more important in a complex disaster involving conflict 
such as in Ivory Coast), in HNS’ strength such as (lack of) local preparedness and funding, and the number of actors 
involved (may require more coordination and more support for coordination from GLS if NS is weak). Accordingly, 
what types of support a NS would request from GLS and how well they can use the standardized tools seem to differ 
depending on a number of factors. Further, the answer to the question of who should undertake supply management 
depends not only on the standards provided by GLS, but also on their adaptability to local needs and how well they 
fit with how HNS undertake demand and information management. If HNS lacks access to information technology, 
funding, human resources, etc. it may be very difficult to make use of sophisticated supply chain management tools 
and processes. This will change over time as and when (logistics) capacity building occur. Accordingly, the service 
offerings and the tools IFRC offers through them, may have to vary over time even to the same HNS. This comes in 
addition to the adaptability required to fit different NS and operations.  
In general, there is a lot of potential for improvement as seen in the significant ‘fail-rate’ of GLS. In particular all 
three cases point at failures in availability of (1) State-of-the art tools, expertise, and delivery information; (2) A 
clear focal point and demand consolidation; (3) Good quotation and payment processes; and (4) Accountable 
reporting on the use of funding. Depending on who is in charge of supply management these should be undertaken 
or supported by GLS. Ivory Coast has a much higher fail-rate than the other two which is related both to their 
requirements’ importance rating (all the ‘As’, see table 2), and to the lack of resources; their own and what was 
provided by GLS or others. Again, the NS and country’s own capacity will have an impact on the needs for 
(sophisticated) standardized tools and processes. Furthermore, referring to table 2 the GLS logistics standards’ 
inability in developing NS logistics capacity in line with their national role indicates a need for; (1) Tools that can 
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help in assessing capacity to identify gaps compared to the needs and; (2) Tools for supporting the development of 
the HNS required local logistics capacity. 
3.1. Use of standardized tools 
The results are somewhat mixed in terms of how well the standards offered by GLS are perceived regarding local 
adaptability. From table 2 we see that Haiti has 7 ‘fails’ which are only half as many as Van who has 14 while Ivory 
Coast points at as many as a total of 31 ‘fails’. 
The literature suggests that standards function as coordination mechanisms on the one hand [30] and as a basis in 
new product and technology design on the other. In the latter case, standards are often linked with modularity in 
terms of modular products and pre-assembly [31]. The concept of modularity is also used in relation to organizing 
[32], and more recently to services: ‘Platform thinking can be used to identify and use the shared, i.e. modular, 
structure and logic of activities and customer offerings in service production’ [33]. Tassey [34] focus on physical 
standards saying that they can specify acceptable product or service performance (quality/reliability), help provide 
scientific evaluation (information standards), specify properties that a product must have for it to function with 
complementary products (compatibility/interoperability) or limit a product to a certain range of characteristics 
(variety reduction). Brunsson and Jacobsson [35] focus on organizational standards such as defining companies’ 
behaviour towards their customers in terms of service and whether they have clear goals’. They include guidelines, 
rules, and specifications for common and repeated use for the purpose of obtaining order or uniformity in a given 
context, discipline, or field [36]. Taking modularity into account when developing standards can provide both 
efficient (e.g. economies of scale, i.e. cost reduction) and effective (e.g. customized solutions, i.e. flexibility) 
solutions [37]. 
From the study we see that IFRC and GLS use standards both of physical and organizational nature. Strategic 
planning and logistics standards offered by GLS include physical standards like prepositioning of standardized 
family packages of basic relief items, and kits for hygiene and cooking. We see that while Haiti made much use of 
this, the demand from Van was less, at least in the beginning. Organizational standards include fixed service fees, 
payment rules, global supplier framework agreements and emergency catalogues with item specifications. We see 
that the operations had challenges in relating to these standards. Furthermore IFRC offers processes, formats and 
manuals for mobilization, procurement, and pipeline reporting. Rosters with and standardized training of logistics 
experts that can be deployed through the IFRC global response tools such as FACT, ERU, and RDRT (Regional 
Disaster Response Team) are also part of the GLS services. We see that there are big differences between the three 
cases regarding use of these.  
Looking at the results from the Ivory Coast in particular, it seems that use of the standardized tools require a 
certain level of capacity in the NS, i.e. they need to know what to request as well as having the adequate funding in 
order to use GLS’ services. As such the local adaptability of the global standard tools offered by GLS is not as high 
as would be ideal, even what could or should be expected. It seems that at this point the standards offered by GLS 
do not sufficiently support the NS’ own work in demand and information management, particularly in situations 
where the HNS is weak or has been weakened because of the disaster. The results indicate that while GLS has come 
quite far in developing standards, there is potential and a need for more modular thinking both of organizational and 
physical types. 
4. Concluding remarks and implications for practice and further research 
Reporting on a study undertaken in cooperation with International Federation Red Cross Red Crescent (IFRC) 
this paper contributes to the understanding of using standard global tools in humanitarian logistics. Three case 
studies of disaster response in Haiti, Turkey, and the Ivory Coast have been presented as basis for a cross-case 
analysis. The main conclusion from the study is that the ‘one size fits all’ approach may have to be modified: 
x With regards to future requirements to humanitarian supply chains their perceived importance vary between the 
operations that have been studied. 
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x The standard tools offered by IFRC Global Logistics Services can to varying degrees adapt to local contexts. 
While standards seem to be much needed in humanitarian logistics, a more systematic modular approach would 
contribute both to efficiency and effectiveness and flexibility. 
In terms of practical implications, organizations should work more with developing, refining and informing about 
their global standardized tools, but simultaneously keep a strict eye as to the needs for local adaptations. For 
example they could consider using a modularized approach so that standards can vary depending on needs, available 
funding, local capacity, and the general context. 
Considering future research, more work is needed on the development and use of standards in humanitarian 
logistics in particular and in international humanitarian assistance in general. When is a standard needed? When 
does it create unnecessary complications? Who should take the lead in creating standards? See for example the 
reluctance and discussions in developing standard specifications for equipment and clothing in the Ebola-epidemic. 
This study is based on one organization and case studies of three different operations. While the cases are interesting 
and represent different disaster types, size, and complexity, additional case studies are required for the purpose of 
generalizing the results.  
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